Below you can find references to some of the topics that are relevant to the project. The list will be regularly updated, and more will follow soon. Also, visitors are very welcome to make their own suggestions by leaving their comments at the bottom of the page.

Cognitive Extension and the Extended Mind

Adams, F., and Aizawa, K. (2008). The Bounds of Cognition, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

—— (2010). ‘Defending the Bounds of Cognition’. In The Extended Mind. (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

—— (2001). ‘The bounds of cognition’. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 14, No.1, 43-64.

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). ‘The Extended Mind’. Ananlysis 58, no. 1: 7-19.

Clark, A., (1998). ‘Magic Words, How Language Augments Human Computation’. In Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. (1998). P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (Eds). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

—— (2001). ‘Reasons, Robots, and the Extended Mind’, Mind and Language, 16;2: 121-145.

—— (2006). ‘Soft selves and Ecological Control’. In Distributed Cognition and the Will. D. Spurrett, D. Ross, H. Kincaid and L. Stephens (eds). MIT Press, Camb. MA

—— (2007). ‘Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of the Extended Mind’, The Journal of Philosophy, 104: 163-192. Also available at .

—— (2008). Supersizing The Mind. Oxford University Press.

—— (2010a). ‘Memento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended’. In The Extended Mind. (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

—— (2010b). ‘Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa’. In The Extended Mind. (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

Hurley, S. (2010). ‘The Varieties of Externalism’. In The Extended Mind. (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

Logan, K. R. (2003). ‘The Extended Mind: Understanding Language and Thought in Terms of Complexity and Chaos Theory’. In Humanity and the Cosmos, Daniel McArthur & Cory Mulvihil (eds). Also available at

—— (2006). ‘The Extended Mind Model of the Origin of Language and Culture’, in Evolutionary Epistemology and Culture, N. Gontier et al. (eds), Printed in Netherlands. 149-167.

—— (2008). The Extended Mind: The Emergence of Language, the Human Mind and Culture. University of Toronto Press.

Menary, R. (2006). ‘Attacking the Bounds of Cognition’, Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 19, No. 3, June 2006, pp. 329-344.

—— (2007). Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbound. Palgrave McMillan.

Palermos, S., O. (2013). ‘Loops, Constitution, and Cognitive Extension’. Cognitive Systems Research.

Ross, D. and Ladyman, J. (2010). ‘The Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and the Mature Sciences’. In The Extended Mind. (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

Rowlands, M. (1999). The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. New York: Cambridge University Press.

—— (2009). ‘Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive’. Philosophical Psychology, 22(1); pp. 1-19.

Rupert, D. R. (2004). ‘Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition’. Journal of Philosophy, 101: 389-428.

—— (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford University Press.

—— (2010). ‘Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems: Does the Scaffolding of Language Extend the Mind?’. In The Extended Mind. (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

Sprevak, M. (2010). ‘Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41: 353-362.

Theiner G. (2011). Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.

Wheeler, M. (2004). ‘Is Language the Ultimate Artifact?’, Language Sciences 26: 693-715.

—— (2005). Reconstructing the Cognitive World. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Wilson, R. A. (2000). ‘The mind beyond itself’. In D. Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, New York University Press, pp. 31-52.

—— (2004). Boundaries of the Mind: The individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press

—— (2004). Boundaries of the Mind: The individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Virtue Epistemology

BonJour, L. (1980). ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. V.

Greco, J. (1999). ‘Agent Reliabilism’, in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology (1999). James Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, pp. 273-296.

—— (2004). ‘Knowledge As Credit For True Belief’, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— (2007) ‘The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge’, Philosophical Issues 17, pp. 57- 69.

—— (2008). ‘What’s Wrong with Contextualism?, The Philosophical Quarterly 58, pp. 299-302.

—— (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.

Kallestrup J. & Pritchard D. H. (forthcoming), ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth’, The European Journal of Philosophy.

Lackey, J. (2007). ‘Why We Do not Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’, Synthese 158, pp. 345-61.

Palermos. S. O. (forthcoming). Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety?, European Journal of Philosophy.

Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming). ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy.

—— (2010a). ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, in A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sosa, E. (1988).‘Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge’. Mind, New Series, vol. 97, No.386, pp. 153-188

—— (1993). ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology’. Nous, Vol. 27, No. 1, 51-65.

—— (1999). ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 141-54.

—— (2000). ‘Skepticism and Contextualism’, Philosophical Issues 10, pp. 1-18.

—— (2007). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Social Epistemology

Faulkner, P. (2000). ‘The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge’. The Journal of Philosophy. 97, 581-601.

Fricker, E. (1994). ‘Against Gullibility’. In Knowing from Words. B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (eds.) 125-61. Dodrecht: Kluwer.

Goldberg, C., S. (2010). Relying on Others. Oxford University Press.

Goldman, A. (2009). ‘Why Social Epistemology Is Real Epistemology’. In Social Epistemology, A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press

Hardwig, J. (1985). ‘Epistemic Dependence’. The Journal of Philosophy, 82: 335-349.

Lackey, J. (2008). Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— (2007). ‘Why We Do not Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’, Synthese 158, pp. 345-61.

Palermos, S., O. (2010), ‘Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony and the Ability Intuition’. Philosophia, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 597-613.

Weiner, M. (2003). ‘Accepting Testimony’. The Philosophical Quarterly 53, 256-64.

Epistemology and Cognitive Extension 

Adams, F. (2012). ‘Extended cognition meets epistemology’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 107-120.

Aizawa, K. (2012). ‘Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognition’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 91-106.

Butts, E. (2012). ‘Mentalism is not ur-internalism’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 233-250.

Carter, A. (2013). ‘Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck’. Synthese. DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3.

Giere, N., R. (2012). ‘Scientific cognition: human centered but not human bound’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 199-206.

Goldberg, S., C. (2012). ‘Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 181-198.

Green, A. (2012). ‘Extending the credit theory of knowledge’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 121-132.

Hetherington, S. (2012). ‘The extended knower’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 207-218.

Kelp, C. (2011). ‘Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology’. Erkenntnis: an International Journal of Analytic Philosophy.

Kirchhoff, M., D. & Newsome, W. (2012). ‘Distributed cognitive agency in virtue epistemology’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 165-180.

Kirsh, D. & P. Maglio, P. (1994). ‘On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action’. Cognitive Science 18, no. 4:513-49.

Loader, P. (2012). ‘The epistemic pragmatic dichotomy’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 219-232.

Menary, R. (2012). ‘Cognitive practices and cognitive character. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 147-164.

Palermos, S. O. (2011). ‘Belief-Forming Processes, Extended’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 741-765.

—— (2014). ‘Knowledge and Cognitive Integration’, Synthese. 191: 1931-1951. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0383-02.

Palermos, O. & Pritchard, D. “Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 105-120.

Pritchard, D. (2010). ‘Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis’. Synthese.Volume 175, Issue 1 Supplement, pp 133-151

Roberts, T. (2012). ‘You do the maths: rules, extension, and cognitive responsibility’. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, No. 2. pp 133-146.

Vaesen, K. (2011). ‘Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition. Synthese 181:515-29.

Philosophical Issues Special Issue on Extended Knowledge’ (forthcoming)

Dynamical Systems Theory and Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

Beer, R. (1995). ‘A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction’. Artificial Intelligence 72, 173-215.

Bressler, S., and Kelso, J. (2001). ‘Cortical coordination dynamics and cognition’. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5, 26–36.

Bressler, S. L. (2002). ‘Understanding cognition through large-scale cortical networks’. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 58–61.

Busemeyer, J., and Townsend, J. (1995). ‘Decision field theory’. In Mind as Motion, R. Port and T. van Gelder (eds). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Busemeyer, J., Townsend, J., T., and Stout, J. (2002). ‘Motivational underpinnings of utility in decision making’. In Emotional Cognition, S. Moore and M. Oaksford (eds). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Crutchfield, J. (1998). ‘Dynamical embodiments of computation in cognitive processes’. The Behavior and Brain Sciences, 21, 635.

Di Paolo, E., A. (2003). ‘Organismically-inspired robotics: Homeostatic adaptation and natural teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop’. In Dynamical Systems Approach to Embodiment and Sociality, K. Murase and T. Asakura (eds). Adelaide: Advanced Knowledge International.

Harvey, I., Husbands, P., and Cliff, D. (1994). ‘Seeing the light: Artificial evolution, real vision’. In From Animals to Animats 3, D. Cliff, P. Husbands, J.-A. Meyer, and S. W. Wilson (eds). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Harvey, I., Husbands, P., Cliff, D., Thompson, A., and Jakobi, N. (1997). ‘Evolutionary robotics: The Sussex approach’. Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 20, pp. 205–224.

Husbands, P., Harvey, I., and Cliff, D. (1995). ‘Circle in the round: State space attractor for evolved sight robots’. Journal of Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 15, pp. 83–106.

Husbands, P., Harvey, I., and Cliff, D. (1995). ‘Circle in the round: State space attractor for evolved sight robots’. Journal of Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 15, pp. 83–106.

Kelso, J. A. S., and Engstrøm, D. (2006). The Complementary Nature. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Palermos, S., O. (2013). ‘Loops, Constitution, and Cognitive Extension’. Cognitive Systems Research.

Petitot, J. (1995). ‘Morphodynamics and Attractor Syntax’. In Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Port, R., F. and van Gelder, T. (eds). MIT press.

Spivey, M., and Dale, R. (2006). ‘Continuous temporal dynamics in real-time cognition’. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 207–211.

Spivey, M. (2007). The Continuity of the Mind. Oxford University Press.

Van Gelder, T. (1995). ‘What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?’. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 7 (Jul., 1995), pp. 345-381.

Reductionism, Downwards Causation, and Emergence

Andersen, B., P., Emmeche, C., Finnemann, N, and Voetmann, C., (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

Baas, N., A. (1994). ‘Emergence, Hierarchies, and Hyperstructures’. Pp. 515-37 in Artificial Life III, edited by Christopher G. Langton. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Fodor, J. (1974). ‘Special Sciences (or: The disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)’. Synthese 28: 97-115.

Heil, J. and Mele, A. (1993). Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kallestrup, J. (2006). ‘The Causal Exclusion Argument’. Philosophical Studies, Volume 131, No. 2, 459-485.

Kim, J. 1993. Supervenience and Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

—— 1989. ‘Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion’. Philosophical Perspectives, 3.

Sawyer, K. (2001). ‘Emergence in Sociology: Contemporary Philsophy of Mind and Some Implications for Sociological Theory’. The American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 107, No.3, pp. 551-585.

Teller, P. 1992. ‘A Contemporary Look at Emergence’. Pp. 139-53, in Emergence or Reduction?Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, A. Bechermann, H. Flohr, and J. Rim. Berlin (eds): Walter de Gruyter.

Wimsatt, W. S. (1986). ‘Forms of Aggregativity’. In Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. M. G. Grene, A. Donagan, A. N. Perovich, & M. V. Wedin (Eds), (pp. 259-291). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Distributed Cognition and Group Agency

Dale, R., and Spivey, M. (2006). ‘Unraveling the dyad: Using recurrence analysis to explore patterns of syntactic coordination between children and caregivers in conversation’. Language Learning, 56, 391–430.

Gaines, B., R. (1994). ‘The Collective Stance in Modeling Expertise in Individuals and Organizations’. Int. J. Expert Systems 71, 22-51.

Giere, R. (2002a). ‘Discussion Note: Distibuted Cognition in Epistemic Cultures’. Philosophy of Science, 69.

—— (2002b). ‘Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition’. In Cognitive Bases of Science, eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stitch and Michael Siegal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

—— (2006). ‘The Role of Agency in Distributed Cognitive Systems’. Philosophy of Science, 73, pp. 710-719.

—— (2007). ‘Distributed Cognition without Distributed Knowing’. Social Epistemology. Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 313-320.

Giere, R. & Moffat, B. (2003). ‘Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge’. Social Studies of Science. 33/2, pp. 1-10.

Heylighen, F., Heath, M., Van Overwalle, F. (2007). ‘The Emergence of Distributed Cognition: A Conceptual Framework’. In Proceedings of collective intentionality IV (2004), Volume: IV, Publisher: University of Siena.

Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard University Press.

List, C. & Pettit, P. 2010. ‘Group Agency and Supervenience’. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44, Issue S1, Spring 2010, 86-105.

Sutton, J., Barnier, A., Harris, C., Wilson, R. (2008). ‘A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory’. Cognitive Systems Research, Issues 1-2, pp. 33–51.

Theiner, G. & Allen, C. & Goldstone, R. (2010). ‘Recognizing Group Cognition’. Cognitive Systems Research, Vol. 11, Issue 4, pp. 378-395.

Theiner, G. (2013). ‘Transactive Memory Systems: A Mechanistic Analysis of Emergent Group Memory’. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(1), 65-89.

Theiner, G. & O’Connor, T. (2010). ‘The Emergence of Group Cognition’. In A. Corradini & T. O’Connor (Eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy (pp. 78-117). New York: Routledge.

Tollefsen, D. 2002. ‘Organizations as True Believers’, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 33 No. 3, Fall 2002, pp. 395-410.

Tollefsen, D., Dale, R. & Paxton, A. (2013). ‘Alignment, Transactive Memory, and Collective Cognitive Systems’. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 49-64.

Wegner, M., Giuliano, T., Hertel, P. (1985). ‘Cognitive interdependence in close relationships’. In W. J. Ickes (Ed.), Compatible and incompatible relationships (pp. 253–276). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Wilson, R., A. (2005). ‘Collective Memory, Group Minds, and the Extended Mind Thesis’. Cognitive Processing, Vol. 6, Issue 4, pp. 227-236.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology special issue on Distributed Cognition and Memory Research

2 thoughts on “Bibliography

  1. Simon Knight says:

    Some or all of these may be of use partic with respect to educational aspects

    Davis, Andrew. “Learning and the Social Nature of Mental Powers.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 37, no. 5 (2005): 635–647. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2005.00148.x.

    Danish school leaver exams allow internet use, translated report:

    Matthews, P., and R. Stephens. “Sociable Knowledge Sharing Online: Philosophy, Patterns and Intervention” (2010).

    Simpson, Thomas W. “Evaluating Google as an Epistemic Tool.” Metaphilosophy 43, no. 4 (2012): 426–445. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01759.x.

    Schoop, Mareike, Aldo de Moor, and Jan L.G. Dietz. “The Pragmatic Web: a Manifesto.” Commun. ACM 49, no. 5 (May 2006): 75–76. doi:10.1145/1125944.1125979.

    Virtue Epistemology:
    Doing work on Education: Baehr, Jason. The Inquiring Mind. Oxford University Press, 2011.

  2. Simon Knight says:

    Judith Simon’s work may also be of some relevance to the informatics element, e.g. her PhD “Knowing Together: A Social Epistemology for Socio-Technical Epistemic Systems” explored technical implications of social epistemology. I’ll be using some of this in the context of ‘collaborative information seeking’.
    I wonder about the testimony of silence in such contexts (Social Q&A, search, curation, whatever) – what does absence of result/reply tell us? (and are there any epistemic injustices in such contexts)…not sure it’s so much an extended mind issue as a generic social-epist one though.

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